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Abstract—This paper reports on lessons learned in rapidly
getting data from a small tactical unmanned aerial system (sUAS)
to an incident commander during a 2012 high fidelity hazardous
materials exercise. In order to capture the Public Safety data-to-
decision path, observational data was collected on three flights
of an AirRobot 100B sUAS, used extensively by the US Army,
with HazMat specialists as part of a chemical train derailment
exercise at the 2012 Summer Institute at Disaster City R©. The
Summer Institute found that (i) the data path requires an average
of 4 steps to go from the field to the incident commander, (ii)
there is no standard data format which reduces the value of
the data nor agreed upon paths for submission which leads
to “broken” paths, (iii) redundant data-to-decision paths are
essential in order to ensure information flow, and (iv) the average
time from when the data was seen by the sUAS to its arrival at
incident command was 27.8 minutes. The observations also led
to three recommendations for companies producing devices: (i)
sUAS should have a reliable capability to record to USB flash
drive; (ii) all video and photographic imagery should have the
relevant GPS and heading information embedded in the data;
and (iii) systems should have the ability to provide cellular and
wireless transmission capabilities (including web browsers and
email) as responders may not have access to public phone Wi-Fi
and internal Ethernet networks. The analysis also suggests that
current measures of quality of service (QoS) focus only on device-
to-device transfer rates, not the when the decision maker sees the
data and if it is in a form to act upon.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Public Safety sector is exploring adoption of sUAS
developed for the US Department of Defense. However, Public
Safety agencies may have different informatics needs and
communications may be limited. Thus, sUAS that work within
the homogeneous operations and communications environment
for the military may not fit Public Safety operations and
communications constraints. This paper reports on lessons
learned in getting data from a small tactical unmanned aerial
system (sUAS) to an incident commander during a 2012 high
fidelity hazardous materials exercise, i.e., the data-to-decision
(D2D) process. The sUAS exercise was directed by Hazmat
subject matter experts (SMEs) from fire rescue, environmen-
tal protection, and homeland security at the chemical train
derailment prop at Disaster City R©. For the purposes of this
paper, the D2D is measured in terms of data transformations,
which is the number of times a human has to intervene in
the transmission process through copying data to new media
or electronically manipulating the data, and the time delays
between collection and delivery to a decision maker.
The paper contributes to the research and development of
sUAS for Public Safety. Understanding the barriers in D2D
process contributes to the theory of robotics and human-
robot interaction. It also provides manufacturers with insights
in how to make their robot systems more attractive to the
Public Safety sector. Section II introduces the related work,
including both military D2D and Public Safety applications.
The Summer Institute Field Study will be described in Section
III. Section IV will discuss the different D2D paths that were
attempted, whether successful or unsuccessful. The specific
data transformations will be discussed by flight in Section V.
Sources of time delay will be described in Section VI. The
major findings from this field study will be presented in Section
VII, with recommendations for robot manufacturers presented
in Section VIII. Section IX offers the conclusion of this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
D2D has been an active area of research in the era of “big
data”, but not much is understood about the applications for
Public Safety, rather than military, applications. Military D2D
systems for unmanned systems provide a model of the Quality
of Information (QoI), Value of Information (VoI), and Quality
of Service (QoS), with the QoS measured with a focus on time
delay in transferring data.
A. Military Data-to-Decision with Unmanned Systems
Bisdikian, et al. [1] discusses the development of an
application-agnostic Quality of Information model to enable
the sharing of sensor-originated information in military appli-
cations. The execution of this framework is beyond the scope
of this paper, but the ideas discussed are extremely relevant.
QoI is split into three properties: QoI, VoI, and QoS. QoI is
about the judgment of the utility of the information in a stream,
while the VoI is based on the information in the context of the
receiver, and the QoS is based on the properties of the channels
between the sender and receiver. VoI can be used to determine
whether a particular source is right for the information sought,
e.g., a ground vehicle is not valuable for an overview of a
situation even though it has a high QoI. QoS is important
when considering the data paths and whether information is
arriving to Command in a way that it will be seen, e.g., an
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SD card sent to a command center without a card reader is
unusable.
Blasch, Russell, and Seetharaman [2] examined data man-
agement to aid with D2D and showed how to process unstruc-
tured data, while leaving the QoI judgments to future work. In
[2], there is a focus on the efficient exchange of data to support
the D2D process. Data exchange incorporates challenging
issues such as dissemination, quality, and timeliness, which
is the focus of the rest of this paper.
B. Public Safety Applications
Public Safety applications may have a different set of
priorities than military applications. For example, [3] reported
that the highest priorities for a sUAS for wildland fire fighting
were: the suitability of the sUAS for the task, the suitability
for the environmental conditions, the distance the sUAS can
fly, and the delivery of the data. The delivery of the data was
defined as ”who can get the data, how directly, and in what file
formats . . . and meta-data such as GPS location.” This shows
that QoI, VoI, and QoS are essential to adoption.
The Value of Information from a sUAS has been discussed
in Murphy, et al. [4]. Two problems encountered at the
Summer Institute 2012 as common complaints and concerns
of emergency responders. These were: (i) lack of good optical
acuity to read labels and placards and (ii) inability to review
photographs in flight. Additionally, one of the common com-
plaints described by Murphy was a lack of infrared payloads,
of which one was used in this exercise exactly as she described
it would be. The concern expressed is still valid because the
FLIR payloads that have been used do not have the capability
to record their own video nor to take pictures. Finally, Murphy
noted that responders would like to have each image stamped
with GPS location and orientation in order to aid integration
into a map and to allow the vehicle to return to a point of
interest.
III. SUMMER INSTITUTE FIELD STUDY
The Summer Institute 2012 Field Study at Disaster
City R©staged a high fidelity reenactment of chemical train
derailment. A simulated hazardous materials train derailment,
shown in Figure 1, was used. Duplicating the insertion of
sUAS at Hurricane Katrina [5], the robot operators presented
an AirRobot 100B commonly used by the US Army to the
incident commander. The AirRobot 100B is a quadrotor and
representative of the typical interfaces and data acquisition
capabilities of small rotorcraft. The team was tasked to provide
the incident commander with a scene overview, chemical
identification from placards and labels on the tanker cars,
leak detection, and observation of tank fill levels using FLIR.
The UAV team was made up of three to four members
depending on the flight: a Pilot, a Safety Observer, and one to
two Mission Specialists who were responders with hazardous
materials expertise. A more thorough description of these roles
can be found in [6]. Following the concept of operations
in [5], the pilot was responsible for flying the sUAS under
the direction of the mission specialist, who as the expert
focused on accomplishing the objectives set by the incident
commander. The sUAS team were required to leave the base
of operations, enter the “warm zone,” and maintain a stand-off
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Fig. 1: Figure depicting operator placement, train derailment,
and incident command.
distance of 305 m (1000 ft). Due to line-of-sight limitations
on the sUAVs, the team chose to set up on top of a building
just outside of the “hot zone”. In order to accomplish the
mission objectives, three flights were conducted over the train
wreck. A fourth flight was conducted, but was unrelated to
these objectives and the train derailment.
Data from the sUAS and meta-data on the D2D process was
collected and archived using the RESPOND-R test instrument.
The data sources were first person video from the pilot, flight
logs from the UAV team, observational logs of the incident
command activities from an ethnographer, and timestamps of
the data and transfers from emails and pictures. Analysis was
conducted by creating a timeline of the day, which focused on
when photos were captured and the transformations they made
along the way to incident command.
IV. SUMMARY OF DATA TRANSFORMATIONS
The first measure of the D2D process is the number of data
transformations. Data transformations followed seven different
paths, shown in Figure 2, but only four were successful at
completing the delivery to Command. Any time a human had
to intervene in the data path, it is counted as a transformation
(e.g., the thumb drive must be plugged into the base station
and the record button must be pressed). Figure 2 shows the
elapsed time as the length of a line, approximating the time or
distance of transfer between the two boxes (walking a thumb
drive to an access point takes less time than transferring over
a low-bandwidth network).
There were three types of data that needed to be transmitted
to Command: video from the robot, hi-resolution pictures
from the robot, and lo-resolution pictures from the robot’s
perspective that were captured on the iPad. Each flight had
the capability to take a video, but hi-definition pictures were
based on the payload and were only available from the still
picture camera, neither the FLIR nor the fixed-lens had the
capability to take still pictures without the iPad.
Of the seven possible paths, only four were successful with
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Fig. 2: Figure depicting data paths from operator to incident command.
the other three merely adding unnecessary steps to the path on
the way to Command. Three of the successful paths were by
“SneakerNet”, which consisted of a person walking the data
to Command in order to deliver a thumb drive. On the first
flight, there were 3 steps to get the pictures on the thumb drive
to Command, but the data took a two step detour to attempt
wireless transmission which led to 5 steps for this flight. Flight
2 also took 3 steps for pictures one set of pictures and 2 steps
for video via thumb drive to Command, with a 1 step detour
to attempt transmission via MiFi, leading to an average of 3.5
steps for this flight. Flight 4 took 3 steps for video and 2 steps
for pictures to Command, with a 3 step detour to send an SD
card to Command only to find out that they could not read
an SD card and then to resend via thumb drive; the average
for this flight was 5.5 steps. The final successful path was by
taking a picture of the iPad interface with an iPhone and then
emailing that picture to Command using the built in cellular
network, which was a 2 step process. The average number of
steps per completed path was 4.
Each of the data paths presented here was used at least
once throughout the flights, and some were used on multiple
flights. The data paths will be discussed further in the next
section, placed in the context of their flight, and the barriers
will also be described.
V. DATA TRANSFORMATION PATHS
The data transformation paths for each of the three sUAS
flights merit additional discussion in order to better understand
how the barriers to the data paths arose. The data paths
for each flight are captured in Figures 3 to 5 and discussed
below. The figures use the convention that a solid line with
no arrowheads denotes a direct connection, while the addition
of a single arrowhead shows a wired transfer. The dashed-
dot lines are representative of a wireless transfer, the dashed
lines show a copy to new media, and the dotted lines show
an unsuccessful transfer. The shapes are difficult to describe
in text, but differentiate between a known expertise (e.g.,
command), data, and information or an interface.
A. Flight 1
The objective for Flight 1 was to provide the overview of
the scene, and it took five steps for the transmission to reach
Command. The flight plan was to go up to around 46 m (150
ft) in the center of the incident and gain establishing shots for
the incident commander. If there was still time remaining after
the initial shots, individual pictures of the components of the
incident were requested (e.g., crossed train cars) following a
path straight over the incident from a lower altitude (dependent
upon obstacles and line of sight considerations). Since the plan
for this flight was based on prior field experience, mission
specialist input was not as necessary and they were given a
computer screen to watch to instruct the pilot to take pictures.
Due to the nature of the flight (needing high-level shots
to establish the scene), the still camera payload was selected
which could take 12 megapixel pictures to an internal SD card.
Since the SD card is internal to the payload, the downside to
these pictures is that they remained with the robot when it was
in the decontamination area for 10 minutes post-flight. On this
flight, 8 pictures were taken for a total of 41.8 MB. Other
downsides to this payload were: that the timestamp data from
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Fig. 3: The two attempted data paths and 5 steps of data
transformation or transmission for Flight 1.
the pictures does not correspond to the GPS timestamp and
there are no location artifacts with the pictures.
The video to Flight 1 should have provided the GPS,
altitude, and heading data to supplement the pictures taken
with the onboard camera. Unfortunately, this video was not
saved due to operator error. The saving of the video from the
operator control unit (OCU) is a three step process: a thumb
drive must be inserted into the base station, the record button
must be pressed to start the recording, and the stop button must
be pressed to stop the recording before the OCU is powered
off. The first two steps of this process were completed, but the
final step was forgotten, so the recording was lost.
After both the flight and decontamination were complete,
the pictures from the SD card were transferred to the thumb
drive from the OCU in order to be plugged in to DistressNet
[7] and transmitted to Command. As can be seen from Figure
3, the use of DistressNet was unsuccessful. This is a great
example of the lessons learned from the Summer Institute
Exercise, because this network was designed for exactly such
a purpose, but the researchers did not know what size files to
expect, so it was unable to be used here. These researchers
took these lessons back to their laboratory to continue work
on DistressNet.
When the files were still not transferred after the next
flight, the decision was made to send all of the data from
both flights on a single thumb drive to Command via a
person physically walking to the building where the incident
commander was staged. This data path is simple and will be
referred to as “SneakerNet”. This path was chosen because
Command needed data to make decisions, so it was necessary
to send the pictures in the easiest and quickest way possible.
B. Flight 2
The objective of Flight 2 was to identify the chemicals
being transported from placards and labels on the tanker cars
and to detect any leaks. Additionally, the incident commander
was looking for a confirmation that this was a radiological
incident. Flight 2 added a Mission Specialist interface so that
the specialized emergency responders could directly view the
video and take their own pictures on the iPad, but this led to
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Fig. 4: The three attempted data paths and 6 steps of data
transformation or transmission for Flight 2.
the team using two different data paths to Command (one was
2 steps and the other was 3-4 depending on the data type).
Due to the nature of the flight (needing better zoom to
get shots of individual train car attributes), the fixed-lens
camera payload was selected which could transmit video, but
no pictures. The iPad became very important on this flight in
order to take pictures, even though the ones captured were
extremely lo-resolution (320x240). On this flight, 48 pictures
were taken for a total of 2.25 MB. The timestamp data from
the pictures corresponds to the iPad timestamp, which was set
to the local time, but the location artifacts with the pictures
referred to the location of the iPad, not the robot. The video
to Flight 2 provided the GPS, altitude, and heading data to
supplement the pictures taken with the iPad.
After the flight was complete, and during decontamination,
the pictures from the iPad were transferred to the thumb drive
from the OCU and two additional methods of transmission
were attempted for the pictures, see Figure 4. The video from
the flight was 379.4 MB, which is an excessive amount to try
to send via email or file transfer, so this was only attempted
by thumb drive. The iPad data was sent with the video, but
in order to try to get visual confirmation of the radiological
material to the commander as soon as possible, the single
picture of the label was sent by taking a picture of the iPad
with an iPhone and then emailing it via the cellular network.
Finally, the iPad pictures were small enough that an attempt
was made to send them via email through the use of a MiFi
(personal cellular hotspot), but the use of this device interfered
with the video feed from the robot, so its use was discontinued.
The data from both this flight and the previous were
additionally transmitted on a single thumb drive to Command
via a person physically walking to the building where the
incident commander was staged. This data path is simple and
will be referred to as “SneakerNet”.
C. Flight 4
The objectives for Flight 4 were to confirm the location of
the two leaks identified in Flight 2, where the leaking product
might be flowing, and to try to get a confirmation of how
full the leaking tanks were. Flight 4 also included the Mission
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Specialist interface, and took up to 6 steps based on a flawed
assumption that Command could read an SD card.
The FLIR camera payload was selected for this flight,
and could transmit video, but no pictures. The iPad was also
very important on this flight, even though the pictures were
extremely lo-resolution (320x240). On this flight, 44 pictures
were taken for a total of 2.1 MB. The timestamp data from
the pictures corresponds to the iPad timestamp, which was set
to the local time, but the location artifacts with the pictures
referred to the location of the iPad, not the robot. The video
to Flight 4 provided the GPS, altitude, and heading data to
supplement the pictures taken with the iPad.
After the flight was complete, and during decontamination,
the pictures from the iPad and the video from the OCU
were both transferred to an SD card due to a shortage of
spare thumb drives, see Figure 5. Due to the troubles from
previous transmission attempts, “SneakerNet” was the only
method attempted. When the SD card arrived at Command, it
was determined that none of their computers had an SD card
reader (a very interesting lapse in QoS), so it was sent back
to be transferred to a thumb drive and was then resubmitted.
VI. ELAPSED TIME
The second measure of the D2D process is the elapsed time
between collection and delivery. As presented in the previous
section, the average data path from the robot to Command
involved 4 steps, it would be expected that such a high number
of steps introduces latency into the delivery of data, but an
average of 27.8 minutes seems excessive.
Flight 1 took an average of 43.6 minutes from the time
the photo was captured until it was delivered to Command,
with delays for decontamination of the robot and for a failed
transmission via DistressNet. With the decision to use the
hi-resolution still camera and its built-in SD card, this flight
had a 10 minute delay for decontamination before the photos
would be available, but it was determined that this delay was
acceptable for the ability to zoom in on the pictures. The next
area of delay was through trying to transmit via DistressNet;
this delay was not one that required a team member to run, so
we were able to accomplish Flight 2 while we were waiting.
After the conclusion of Flight 2, it was determined that walking
the data was the best option so the images from both flights
were sent at the same time, but the walking added about 10
minutes of transmission time.
Flight 2 took an average of 25.5 minutes from the time
the photo or video was captured until it was delivered to
Command. With the additional capability of the iPad to take
pictures locally, it was expected that this delay could be
reduced significantly, but it still took time to transfer the
pictures to a computer and to a thumb drive. One picture was
prioritized and sent from an iPhone by taking a picture of the
iPad picture, but even this picture was not sent until Flight
2 was complete and this picture alone gave no indication of
where the materials would be located in the derailment because
Command did not yet have any of the overview shots from
Flight 1.
The Flight 4 data took an inconclusive amount of time due
to the delays in delivery because of the misunderstanding about
the ability of Command to use an SD card.
VII. FINDINGS
The analysis of the D2D process provides four findings:
1) The data path requires an average of 4 steps to
go from the field to the incident commander (e.g.,
data from operator control station over wireless, to a
laptop with USB drive, which is then hand carried),
versus a more desirable 1 step, such as sending
data from the operator control station directly to the
incident commander’s laptop.
2) There is no standard data format which reduces the
value of the data (e.g., imagery or video which is
not geo-tagged) nor agreed upon paths for submission
which leads to “broken” paths (e.g., the assumption
that the incident commander’s laptop can read a SD
card when it cannot; use of low bandwidth mobile ad
hoc networks that are not sufficient for transmitting
imagery).
3) Redundant data-to-decision paths are essential in or-
der to ensure information flow as the communica-
tions infrastructure evolves or encounters temporary
failures.
4) The average time from when the data was seen by
the sUAS to its arrival at incident command was
27.8 minutes. The observed data-to-decision process
indicated that the sUAS team expended significant
time and effort in data editing and data transfer,
delaying additional flights and suggesting that a full
time “data manager” be added to the team to free
them from those duties.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the analysis, ethnographic observations, and after
action report from the responders, there are three recommen-
dations for for improving the D2D process with sUAS.
1) sUAS should have a reliable capability to record
video to a USB flash drive so that at worst case, data
can be physically transported to the incident comman-
der. Currently the standard is to record video from the
vehicle in one of two ways: (i) record hi-definition
video on the camera, or (ii) stream the video back
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to the ground station and record it there. The first
approach runs into problems because this video is
usually not synced with the telemetry data and will
run into delays during decontamination of the robot.
The second approach is problematic because it is gen-
erally video of a much lower quality. Both approaches
are prone to user errors, but manufacturers should try
to make the process as short and easy as possible. One
approach might be to automatically start a recording
on take-off and stop it on landing.
2) All video and photographic imagery should have the
relevant GPS and heading information embedded in
the data or as an overlay so that the command staff
can correlate the data with their maps.
3) Systems should have the ability to provide cellular
and wireless transmission capabilities (including web
browsers and email) as responders may not have
access to public phone Wi-Fi and internal networks.
The reason that this recommendation is for the man-
ufacturers is because of two issues encountered in
this exercise: (i) the inability of an independently
developed network to handle the bursty data of the
sUAS, and (ii) the incompatibility of off-the-shelf
solutions with the proprietary hardware of the robots.
Developing these capabilities in-house will allow
manufacturers to test hardware combinations and to
choose solutions which will be compatible with their
known data transmission requirements.
IX. CONCLUSION
The exercise indicates that sUAS which fit military D2D
processes are not compatible with Public Safety D2D expec-
tations, but can be adapted with minor upgrades. The value
of the information (VoI) from the sUAS was highly rated
by the responders because the aerial vehicle provide new
viewpoints that could be directed in real-time, but the quality
of service (QoS) was low as evidenced by the large number
of data transformations (avg. 4 steps) and elapsed time in
getting data to the incident commander (avg. 28 minutes). The
operational definition of D2D was able to highlight barriers
in transferring data. This suggests that the network-oriented
definition of QoS, as the quality of the medium being used to
transport data, should be expanded to include the number of
transformations. The analysis also poses the question of how
to measure the relationship between VoI and QoS as it does not
matter how quickly valuable information arrives at Command
if they do not know it is there, or if they are unable to use the
data effectively due to incompatible formats, poor displays, or
lacking visualizations of the data; i.e., high QoS, high potential
VoI, but unrealized in current command structure.
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